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STATUTORY CHANGES IN NORTH CAROLINA
LAW IN 1925
(CONTINUED)

COURTS
Ch. 32 amends C. S. 1536, so that it is now possible for towns
and cities in the State which have acquired a population of one thousand or over to establish a recorder's court. Before this change
towns and cities of five thousand or over were the only ones entitled
to a recorder's court. Another provision of the same chapter authorizes the governing body of the town or city establishing such a court
to provide a schedule of fees to be charged by the recorder.
C. S. 1541 was amended so that the recorder's court has jurisdiction of all offenses committed outside the corporate limits of the
municipality within a radius of five miles.
COUNTY CouRTs-Chapters 135, 233, 242, 250 and 305. Ch. 135
makes possible the establishment of county courts, the purpose of
which is to relieve the congestion of court dockets. It is made plain

that this act does not affect any act now existing which establishes
any inferior court, or that may be created under the existing law,
but to be supplemental to the present law.
The act provides for the establishment of the county court by
the Board of County Commissioners upon a petition of the majority
of resident attorneys within the county. It can be discontinued in
the same manner. When the Board of County Commissioners have
established the court, the Governor appoints the judge whose term
of office is four years, and whose salary is one hundred dollars for
each week he is engaged in holding court. The Clerk of Superior
Court or his deputies shall ex officio perform the duties of clerk and
shall be paid a salary of not less than one thousand dollars annually.
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The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil
actions founded on contract or tort wherein the Superior Court now
has exclusive original jurisdiction. In all actions to try title to land,
to prevent trespass and to restrain waste thereon, the court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court. It shall also have concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court in all actions pending in
said court to issue and grant temporary injunctions and orders. In
no action, however, can the amount involved be more than three
thousand dollars.
Either party may demand and have a trial by jury as provided in
the Superior Court; that a failure to demand a jury trial, at the
proper time, shall be deemed a waiver of the right; that the judge,
when in his opinion the ends of justice would be best served, may
have a jury called in for the determination of the issues which he
may deem material. In case either party demands a jury, it shall be
composed of twelve members.
There is no essential difference in rules of practice, rules of procedure, number and causes of challenges, subpoening of witnesses,
etc., than is the case, in the Superior Court, since the purpose is to
provide for the trial of causes which have heretofore been tried in
the Superior Court.
The summons runs in the name of the State and is returnable as
is provided by law for summons in the Superior Court; the plaintiff
shall file complaint on or before the return day of such summons;
and the defendant shall file a written answer or demurrer and shall
make his motion in writing during the term to which the summons
is returnable and that the case shall stand for trial at the next succeeding term.
Cases pending in the Superior Court and courts of the justices of
peace may be tried in the established county court. Upon appeal
from the county court the Superior Court may either affirm, modify
and affirm the judgment of the county court or remand the cause
for a new trial.
C. S. 1584 provides for the establishment of municipal-county
courts and the election of the recorder. Ch. 233 amends this article
and provides for the establishment of such courts without submission to a popular vote, and to confer civil jurisdiction thereon. The
governing body of the municipality and the Board of County Commissioners by joint resolution shall establish these courts.
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Ch. 216, Pub. Laws of 1923. The General Court Act, is amended
by allowing the establishment of county courts in any county in which
there are situated two or more cities each of which has a population
of 20,000, without submitting the proposition to a vote of the people.
Section 7 of this chapter is amended so as to provide the same rules
of .procedure, as nearly as possible, as is practiced in the Superior
Court.
Ch. 85, Pub. Laws, extra session, 1924, is amended by Ch. 250
by adding a solicitor for the court. It also provides that summons
may be issued against defendant outside the county. Section 12, Public Laws of 1923 is amended requiring defendant to file pleadings
within twenty days after service of copy of complaint.
Ch. 305 provides that any county where there is now established
a recorder's court or a county court which possesses criminal jurisdiction of misdemeanors, and to bind over to the Superior Court persons charged with a felony, may by resolution, confer upon such
court civil jurisdiction. The county court or recorder's court, under
this act, has concurrent jurisdiction with justices of peace in civil
matters; concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court in civil
actions founded on contract or tort, wherein the Superior Court now
has exclusive original jurisdiction. These courts do not have jurisdiction of any case in which the sum involved is in excess of twentyfive hundred dollars.
There may be a written waiver of the jury trial by the parties in
all civil causes where the recorder's court or county court has concurrent jurisdiction with justices of peace. In all other cases the
selection of the jurors is the same as that which is followed in the
Superior Court.
Challenges, rules of procedure, rules of court, subpoening witnesses, costs, are all practically the same as prescribed for the causes
tried in the Superior Court. Since the purpose of this Act is to
relieve the congestion in court dockets and to provide for needed
facilities for speedy trial of causes, there seems to be a very flexible
method provided for carrying out this purpose. The machinery provides that the Board of County Commissioners shall, by resolution,
fix, determine, and designate the terms of court for the trial of all
causes as provided for in this Act. Furthermore, where it should
appear that there would be no cases at any term of court designated
by the commissioner's resolution, the recorder or judge may cancel
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the term; and also, upon the presentation by the recorder or judge
of the court of a statement to the county commissioners setting
forth that an accumulation of civil causes exists, the Board of Commissioners may prescribe additional terms, but no such additional
term for the trial of civil causes shall be called except upon thirty
days notice to be'posted at the courthouse door.
All civil causes pending at the time of the enactment of this act in
the Superior Court are triable in the courts provided for in this Act,
and it is the duty of the Clerk of the Superior Court to prepare the
calendars and docket in order that the causes may be tried.
The Board of County Commissioners are to fix the date of the
first session of court, but no session shall be held within less than
the providing for the terms thereof.
C. H. D.

MORTGAGES AND LIENS
LIENS ON CROPs FOR ADVANCES-C. S. 2480 provided that a
person making any advances of money or supplies to any person
engaged in cultivating the soil was entitled to a lien on the crop or
crops made during the year. Before any advance is made, an agreement in writing specifying the amount of the advance shall be made,
and shall be registered within 30 days after date in the office of the
register of the county in which the person making the advance
resides. Such liens are to have preference to all others except the
laborer's and landlord's lien.
Chapter 302 has amended the above provision as follows. The
person making the advance is entitled to a lien on all crops made
within one year from the date of the agreement in writing. Registration of the agreement is required as before except the words
"within 30 days after date" have been struck from the Statute. A
proviso was added to the effect that the lien so acquired shall continue
as to any crops which may be harvested after the end of the said
year, but shall be effective only to those planted within the period of
12 months after the execution of the said lien, and referred to
therein.
It would seem that the above Statute as amended would bring
about no change in the rule of the Courts that the land on which the
crops are to be grown must be sufficiently identified at the time the
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lien is executed, and that the land is sufficiently identified when
described as "a field or farm in possession of the mortgagor or
seller."'
It does, however, raise some question as to the following rule of
law; "It is now settled that an unplanted crop is the subject of
mortgage, 2 but the authorities do not warrant the conveyance of an
indefinite prospective unplanted crop, and we think it should be
limited to crops planted or about to be planted, as the crop next
following the conveyance." 3 The Statute as it now stands seems to
indicate that this rule is to be relaxed somewhat. What is the effect
of the provision that the lien shall be effective only to those crops
planted within the calendaryear after the execution of the said lien.
There might be some doubt as to the meaning of "calendar year" but
presumably that means within 12 months after the execution of the
lien. It is so written in the note setting forth the changes in the
statute but when the changes were copied into the statute it was made
to read "calendar year." Suppose then a person made an advance on
a crop after it had been planted and the proceeds of the crop were
insufficient to satisfy the advance, would a lien for the balance of
the advance attach if another crop were planted within 12 months
but not harvested within that time?
The holding that the lien would be good between the parties without registration would still apply as the purpose of registration is to
make the lien effective as against bona fide purchasers and creditors. 4
However, the statute as amended fails to require registration within
any specified time before the harvesting of the crop. What would
be the effect of two persons making advances on the same crop,
when the latter advance, in point of time, was the first registered?
It has been held that a mortgage on a crop, not expressed to be for
advances, and not registered within 30 days after execution, has no
rights as an agricultural lien under Sec. 2480.5 This would hardly
give a basis for a decision in the case put above, as the thirty day
provision is omitted by the present law, but the first lien registered
should prevail. It would be a race for the register's office.
1

Weil v. Flowers, 109 N. C. 212; Gwathney v. Etheridge, 99 N, C. 571.
'Harris v. Jones, 83 N. C. 317.
, Wooten v. Hill, 98 N. C. 49.
'Reese v. Cole, 95 N. C. 87.
'Cooper v. Kimball, 123 N. C. 120.
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There seems to be no reason why the present statute should
change the existing decisions in regard to a lien on a crop when the
owner has contracted with a Co6perative Marketing Association. It
has been held that the defendant can place a mortgage or lien on the
crop for supplies with which to cultivate and produce the same, and
that the contract with the Association contemplates such a mortgage.
Also that the growers right to. mortgage his crop for the bona fide
purpose of raising the same is not to be in any way hindered or lightly
interfered with." This would give a person who was hostile to the
association a chance to foreclose the lien and sell the crop under
execution, and could not be prevented by the association. If the
grower did not default and the association got the crop, it would be
subject to the lien and the lienholder would have to be satisfied. A
member might obtain advances in excess of his needs and thereby
create a lien which would absorb the whole crop, the effect of which
would be simply selling the crop to the lienholder or mortgagee
before it was made. However, the association, in order to exist,
must get the crops. The crops could be taken subject to the liens,
and payments could be made to the grower according to his interest
in the crop.
W. H. A.
CH. 287-Provides for the recording and cross-indexing in the
lis pendens docket by the Clerk of Court of the notice of every petition in a suit for the registration of titles to land. Such notice is to
be recorded in every county in which part of the land lies. The
statute very properly gives to the bringing of proceedings under the
Torrens Act, the status of pending litigation.
CH. 223-LAND MORTGAGE AsSOCIATIONs-The General Assem-

bly has authorized and directed the State Department of Agriculture
to establish a bureau for the'conservation and development of land.
This bureau is to function through Land Mortgage Associations with
a capital stock of not less than $20,000. Any number of persons, not
less than fifteen, may associate to establish such association which
shall be a corporation, organized under the laws of this State, for
the purpose of making loans on farm and forest lands and dwelling
houses in the State and taking first mortgages therefor, not exceed8 Tobacco

121 S. E. 631.

Growers' Marketing Assn. v. Patterson (1924), 187 N. C. 251;
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ing 65 per cent of the value of such realty. Each such mortgage is
to be payable on the amortization plan maturing in not less than
twenty years. The associations may issue bonds secured by the
mortgages and notes so taken or purchased. The bonds shall be a
"legal investment for savings associations, tiust companies, or other
financial institutions chartered under the laws of this State and shall
also be a legal investment for trustees, executors, administrators, or
custodians of public or private funds, or corporations, partnerships
or associations." The State banking laws in so far as they are
applicable and not in conflict with the provisions in this chapter shall
apply to the land mortgage associations.
CH. 252-CANCELLATION

OF

MORTGAGES

GIVEN

IN

LIEu

OF

BoNDs-C. S. 348, as amended by Public Laws of 1921, ch. 29, relative to cancellation of mortgages given in lieu of official bonds has
been re-written, adding that when such party as administrator, executor, guardian, collector, or receiver has filed his final account and the
time required by statute for the bond given by any such party to
remain in force for the purpose of action thereon has expired, or
when such officer has fully complied with the trust and the time
within which suit could be brought has expired, then such mortgage
may be cancelled.
C. A. T.
MOTOR VEHICLES
The provisions of Chapter 50 of Public Laws of 1925 are significant for two particular reasons. In the first place they show the
public reaction through legislative enactment against the "bus war"
which raged in the state not many months ago. The competitive
methods adopted by the bus owners during that hectic period no
doubt had tremendous influence in causing the legislature to enact
measures that would stabilize this growing public service in North
Carolina. In the second place they well illustrate the now wellestablished and growing tendency for legislatures to delegate to
commissions the power to regulate rates and other matters.'
The act applies to motor vehicle carriers engaged in the business
of transporting persons and property for compensation over any
improved public highway or streets in the State. The term "motor
1 Cook, Principles of Corporation Law, p. 392; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Ry. Com,,z. (1913), 231 U. S. 457; Nichols, Judicial Review of the North
Carolina Corporation Commission. 2 N. C. Law Review, 69.
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vehicles" within the purview of this act, applies only to those operating a service between different towns and cities. The term
"improved public highway" in the act means every improved highway in the State, or that may be declared to be a highway, or county
highway, or streets of any city or town.
Such motor vehicle carriers are to be operated in strict accordance
with the provisions of this act subject to control and regulation of
the Corporation Commission; Provided, this act does not apply to
vehicles used for transporting persons to and from schools, churches,
picnics, or religious services of any kind, or to United States mail
carriers operating star routes exclusively, to farmers' or dairymen's
vehicles used in their businesses, or to vehicles engaged in carrying
persons to places of historical and educational interest in the State.
The person or corporation proposing to operate such a line of
transportation must apply to the Corporation Commission for license,
and in the application specify (a) the name, address and postoffice
of applicant, (b) the proposed route, (c) the kind of transportation,
whether passenger or freight, and seating capacity and tonnage, size
and weight of vehicles, (d) proposed schedule, (e) proposed rates,
(f) length of time, if at all, of previous engagements in same business
in the State, and schedule and rates maintained.
The Commission will fix a time for public hearing of the application. Three days before the time set the applicant must cause notice
of the hearing to be published in a newspaper of general circulation
through the territory in which he proposes to do business, At the
hearing, the Commission will take into consideration the past record
of applicant in the business, his character, his court record and any
other matter tending to show his qualifications.
The Corporation Commission shall observe the recommendations
of the Highway Commission as to the size and weight of the motor
vehicles and kinds of tires best adapted to the highways over which
the applicant proposes to do business. No license shall be issued for
any motor vehicle of greater width than 86 inches, and greater loaded
weight than 15,000 pounds for passenger traffic, or greater width
than 86 inches and greater loaded weight than 9 tons for freight.
The Commission at all times has power to reduce the size and weight,
and to suspend the operation of the vehicles, in accordance with the
conditions of the highways at any particular time.
The operator of such motor vehicles shall file a bond, the amount
of which shall be determined by the Commission. This bond shall
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be for the benefit and subject to action thereon by any person sustaining actionable injury to his person or property by negligence of
the operator.
Section 4 of the act gives to the Corporation Commission full
power to alter, regulate, suspend, or in any other manner make the
persons or corporations operating these lines conform to the regulations made by the Commission for the public interest. The Commission can prescribe a speed limit for these vehicles less than that
prescribed by the statute law of the state, but cannot prescribe a
greater speed.
The Commission may order a violator of these regulations before
it for a hearing, and may suspend, revoke, alter, or amend its certificate, subject to appeal to Superior Court from the Commission's
decision. Pending the appeal, the operator must suspend business
altogether, unless the Commission gives its permission to continue.
The driver must 'e over 18 years of age, and he shall be examined
to ascertain his general character, his skill, and knowledge of the
rules of the road before license will issue.
The Secretary of State shall collect a privilege, or franchise, or
license tax of 6% of the gross amount received from all fares and
charges, in advance, payable quarterly. The persons shall keep their
books and accounts as prescribed by the Secretary of State, and make
a verified report monthly. In case the route is partly within and
partly without the State, the privilege tax shall be collectible in proportion to the mileage in the State compared with the total mileage.
If the carrier refuses to compute such mileage, the Secretary of State
may do so, and certify the same to the sheriff through whose county
the carrier operates, and the certificate shall have the force and effect
of a judgment and execution, and the sheriff may levy on and sell
the property of the carrier.
The moneys collected under this act shall, after deducting necessary expenses, be paid to the counties, cities and towns through which
these vehicles operate, in proportion to the mileage therein compared
with the total mileage in use by the vehicles.
Any one guilty of violating this act shall be fined not less than
$50 and not more than $500, or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court.
CH. 265-Makes it a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum fine of
$50 or maximum imprisonment of 30 days, to drive a motor vehicle
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on the public roads past a public school bus which is taking on or
putting off school children, without first bringing such vehicle to a
full stop not less than 50 feet from such bus.
CH. 272-Amending C. S. 2618, provides: that no party shall
operate a motor vehicle on any road or highway or streets of the
State in excess of:
1. 20 miles per hour in residential sections. The limit in C. S.
2618 (amended by Ex. Sess. 1921, ch. 98) was the same.
2. 12 miles per hour in the business section of any city. This is
a change from 10 miles in C. S. 2618.
3. 15 miles per hour when passing any school or church when
people are leaving or entering.
4. 15 miles per hour when traversing intersections of highways
when the driver's view is obstructed. The driver's view is deemed
obstructed when at all times within 100 feet of the intersection he
does not have a clear view of all the highway for a distance of 200
feet from such intersection.
5. 15 miles per hour when traversing or going around corners of
a highway.
6. 35 miles per hour beyond the residential section of incorporated cities. This is a change from 30 miles.
7. No person shall operate on the public highways or streets a
motor vehicle with muffler cut-out open, or with exhaust whistle or
other objectionable signal devices. C. S. 2618 forbade the muffler
cut-out open inside the corporate limits.
CH. 283-Enlarges the scope of C. S. 4506, which makes it a
misdemeanor to operate an automobile on the public highway, while
intoxicated, by striking out the words "public highway" and adding
"any public highway or cartway or other road over which the public
has a right to travel." The amended act also permits the judge, in
his discretion, to deny to a person guilty of violating this act the
right to drive an automobile for not more than 12 months.
CI. 297-Makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine not exceeding $50, for a driver of a school bus carrying children to and from
school to drive at a greater speed than 25 miles per hour along an,
public street or public highway in the State.
S.E.V
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
MUNICIPAL Am

PUBLIC BENEFIT-In a note in the NORTH
the question of municipal aid to railroad
enterprises, as in building a passenger station, was discussed, and
incidentally certain other similar questions were mentioned, like
maintaining a moving picture theatre, building a hotel, and furnishing money to chambers of commerce and boards of trade.' One of
the special acts mentioned was chapter 268, Private Acts of 1923,
authorizing the city of High Point to appropriate a certain per cent
of taxation, to be expended by the Chamber of Commerce in promoting the establishment of industrial enterprises and for such other
purposes as, in their discretion, would advance the interests of the
city.
About the time the note was written, this statute was before the
Supreme Court upon the question of its validity, and it was held that
this was not a necessary expense, and that the act could not authorize
2
such expenditure without the popular vote.
AND

CAROLINA LAW REVIEW,

Ch. 33, Pub. Laws of 1925, provides that the governing body of
any county, city or town may appropriate from the general taxes a
fund not less than one-fortieth of one per cent, nor more than onetenth of one per cent of the assessed valuation of property, to be
expended under the direction of such governing body, or through
such agencies as they shall prescribe, for the purpose of aiding and
encouraging the location of railroads, manufacturing and other industrial enterprises in the county or in or near the city or town, and for
such other purposes as will, in the discretion of the governing body,
increase the population, taxable property, agricultural industries and
business prospects of the county, city or town. The act further provides that no noney shall be raised or appropriated for such purposes
until the act shall have been approved by a majority of the qualified
voters in an election held for that purpose. 3
This last requirement brings the act within the rule laid down by
the Supreme Court, and it applies to counties as well as to cities and
towns. It would seem to be the intention of the act to declare the
particular purposes mentioned to be public purposes, and to justify
the expenditure of money, with the popular vote, although they do
not come under the class of necessary expense. Whether the further
provision that the governing body may expend the money for such
12 N. C. Law Rev., 38.
2

Ketchie v. Hedrick (1923), 186 N. C. 392, 119 S. E. 767.
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other purposes as will, in their discretion, promote the best interests
of the community, gives an unlimited discretion in determining the
purpose for which the money may be appropriated, might be open to
question.
The act further provides that in any incorporated town of less
than three thousand inhabitants, instead of a popular election, the
will of the voters may be determined by a petition in writing, signed
by at least three-fourths of all the registered voters whose names
appear upon the registration books for the previous municipal elec•tion, and provided that such three-fourths signing the petition shall
be the owners of three-fourths of the total taxable property appearing upon the tax lists last prepared by the municipality.
This would seem to be a new regulation, applying in some respects
the rule laid down for Local Improvements in municipal corporations. 4 The latter statute, however, refers to the improvements of
streets and sidewalks, which would come under the head of necessary
expense, and also contemplates the levying of assessments upon the
adjoining property for special benefits. The Constitution provides
that no debt may be contracted nor tax levied for other than necessary expense, "unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified
voters." 5 Whether a petition signed by three-fourths of the qualified
voters is a compliance with the requirement of "vote of a majority
of the qualified voters," might be questioned. So far as the persons
who are to pay the tax are concerned, it is a much more responsible
and satisfactory authority, but the popular vote contemplates a public
election under the ordinary machinery, with the right in every qualified voter to express his will by his vote. This is not intended as
captious criticism of the statute, but to raise the serious question
whether in any case a petition by any number or all of the registered
voters can take the place of the constitutional requirement of a
popular vote.6 It is rather a dangerous proposition both for the
persons paying and the persons receiving the public money, for other
than a necessary expense, unless it has been legally authorized, as
has been recently decided in the case of Brown v. R. R.7
'A similar statute was passed for the city of Statesville in 1923, ch. 257.
'C. S. 2703, et seq.
Const., Art. 7, s. 7; C. S. 2691.

N. C. 146, 150, 106 S. E. 481; Cotton Mills
v. Corers. (1891), 108 N. C. 678, 684, 13 S. E. 271.
'Long v. Corers. (1921), 181

'(1924)

188 N. C. 52, 123 S. E. 633.
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In this case, the town of S wished to induce a railroad company
to make that town a starting point for its road rather than the neighboring town of D. A mass-meeting of the citizens was held, at which
the mayor and board of aldermen and representatives of the railroad
were present. The mass-meeting recommended that the town appropriate $5,000 to buy the right of way and give it to the railroad to
secure the location of the road. The representatives of the railroad
consented to this; the mayor and aldermen immediately held a meeting and made the appropriation; the money was paid and the road
was built. About two years later, a citizen who had been in the
meeting and had either consented to the action or made no objection,
brought an action to compel the repayment of this money, and it was
held that the payment was unauthorized and the railroad was liable,
and also that the town officers were liable, except for the statute of
limitations.
A.C.M.
THE: BoNm RECORDING AcT-Ch. 100 provides for the recording
in the office of the state auditor statements concerning bonds and
notes having a fixed maturity of at least one year after the date
thereof, of counties, townships, school districts, municipal corporations and taxing districts. The statements shall contain the name of
the board in which is vested the authority and power to levy taxes
for the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds and notes,
and the dates upon which the payments of principal and interest
become due. The bonds are not valid until such statement is filed
with the state auditor.
The state auditor is required to notify the board having power
to levy taxes for the payment of the bonds or of the interests, at least
thirty days before taxes are to be levied, of the amount that will have
to be raised by taxation for payments of principal and interest; and
a failure of the board to levy the taxes required subjects every member of the board to a penalty of $200 upon suit brought by any bond
holder, unless such member of the board has had his vote recorded
as being in favor of the tax levy required.
The State auditor is also required to notify the treasurer or disbursing officer, who has the duty of paying the principal or interest
of any bonds, at least thirty days before such installment becomes due
of the amount of such installment, and the failure of such officer, if
the funds are available, to pay the installment subjects such officer to
a penalty of $200 upon suit brought by any bond holder. Any
person, who individually or as member of any board, diverts funds

14
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raised for the payment of principal or interest to any other purpose,
is also liable to a penalty of $200 upon suit by any bondholder.
Thus the State auditor has a certain measure of supervision over
the payment of principal and interest of bonds, and the non-performance upon part of officials of the district to provide for the payments of principal and interest subjects them to a penalty.
The new law is a restatement and consolidation of Chapter 1,
Public Laws of 1921, Extra Session, and Chapter 123, Public Laws
of 1923, both of which are repealed thereby. The new law does not
require the State Auditor to report violations to the solicitors.
BOND REGISTRATION AcT-Ch. 129 provides for registration in
the name of the owner of bonds of counties, cities, towns, school districts and school taxing districts, in registers to be kept by the treasurer or financial agent. Such registration does not effect the payment
of interests, but the principal shall be payable to the person in whose
name the bonds are registered. The bonds may be transferred upon
the register or made payable to bearer by filing of application with
the registrar and indorsement on the back of the bond.

CH. 141-Requires that in the awarding or entering into a contract for the erection, construction or alteration of public buildings,
when the entire cost of such work will exceed $10,000, separate
specifications must be prepared for the following branches of work:
1. Heating and ventilating. 2. Plumbing and gas fitting. Separate
bids are to be secured and the contracts awarded separately to the
lowest bidder regularly engaged in their respective line of work.
This applies only to public contracts with counties and cities and also
in case of the State itself.
It has been held that failure to observe such statutory requirements renders a contract invalid. "Respecting the mode in which
contracts by corporations should be made, it is important to observe
that when the mode of contracting is specially and plainly prescribed
and limited, that mode is exclusive and must be pursued, or the contract will not bind the corporation." 1 Whether the contractor could
recover upon an implied promise to pay for benefits received has not
2
been definitely decided, the weight of authority denying recovery.
S.C.
'Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) sec. 783; Wadsworth v. Con-

cord (1903) 133 N. C. 587, 45 S. E. 948.
'Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) Ch. 18 and cases cited; Wadsworth v. Concord, note 1. supra.
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PROPERTY RIGHTS
Ch. 7 amends C. S. 1654, Rule 8, of the Rules of Descent. The
unamended rule provided that a widow should be deemed heir of
her husband, when he died leaving none other who could claim as heir.
The amendment makes the rule mutual between husband and
wife, as follows: "When any person dies intestate, leaving none
who can claim as heir to such deceased person, but leaving a widow
or husband, such widow or husband shall be deemed to be his heir,
and, as such, inherit his estate."
Construing the original Rule 8, the Supreme Court held that the
rule could only apply to property not devised by the husband. Hence,
if the husband's will gave a life estate to the widow, with remainder
over to his "legal heirs," and the widow failed to dissent to the will,
Rule 8 would not apply. Therefore, in such a case, if the husband
had no legal heirs, the property, at death of the wife, would escheat
instead of going to the wife's heirs.1
The amendment seems to codify the Granthamv. Jinnette decision
by the addition of the word, "intestate." Undoubtedly such term
will be construed to cover a partial, as well as a total, intestacy.
Ch. 264.

CONCERNING

GIrTS, GRANTS, DEVISES

OR BEQUESTS

CREATED FOR RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL, CHARITABLE, OF BENEVOLENT UsEs-The first section of the Act provides that no gift, grant,

bequest or devise, in trust or otherwise, to religious, educational,
charitable, or benevolent uses, shall be invalid because of indefinitness, uncertainty, discretion given to trustees, nor because of conflict
with the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In absence of a positive statute, there has been, and is, a split
among the American authorities over the doctrine of Cy Pres, i.e.
the doctrine of approximation, whereby the intent of the grantor or
testator, which it is impracticable to carry out literally, is carried out
as near as possible. A majority of the courts have repudiated the
doctrine entirely, and few, if any, of the minority upholding it have
done so without qualification.' In courts adopting it as law, Cy Pres
has frequently been used to sustain wills in which perpetuities were
attempted, so that, if it can possible be done, the devise is not regarded as utterly void, but is construed in such a manner as to carry
'Grantham v. Jinnette (1919), 177 N. C. 229, 98 S. E. 724.
See Decennial Dig. "Charities" No. 37, 50. Also Century, ibid., No. 91
to 93.
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out the intention of the testator in so far as the Rule Against Perpetuities will allow. 2 The principle has also been used with reference

to charitable trusts, where a definite duty is to be performed which
cannot be done in exact conformity with the testator's plan; in which
case the courts have caused the duty to be performed with as close
approximation to the original plan as is practicable.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has followed the majority
of the American courts in refusing to apply the doctrine. In the
recent case of Thomas v. Clay,8 Clarkson, J., after stating that the
Cy Pres doctrine does not obtain in this State, cited three concurring
circumstances as necessary to create a trust, viz: First, sufficient
words to raise it; second, a definite object; and, third, an ascertained
object.
By the enactment of the statute herein discussed, therefore, the
Legislature has established the equivalent of the Cy Pres doctrine in
North Carolina. And, not only has the doctrine been settled by such
enactment, but it has been extended to a degree seldom attempted by
the courts which have declared it to be law. 4
The first section of the Act goes on to provide for the appointment of trustees by the Superior Courts, should the trust device be
used, and no trustees are named in the instrument. Of course this
is not a departure, having been applied as a principle even by the
courts which have refused the Cy Pres doctrine.5 The second section extends the enactment to religious, educational and charitable
trusts created by persons domiciled in other states, which would have
been valid under the law of the state of domicile, even though one
or more of the trustees or one or more of the beneficiaries have foreign domicile. Section three provides that the trusts described in
the second section shall be valid whether created before or after the
F.S.R.
enactment.
'The reaction of the courts has been that a limitation in complete violation

of the Rule Against Perpetuities is void in toto. The Cy Pres construction
applies only to limitations partly within the Rule; in which case the courts

may declare the devise valid as to the part which does not contravene the
Rule. See Post v. Rohrbach (1892) 142 Illinois 606, 32 N, E. 687.

' Thomas v. Clay (1924) 187 N. C. 778, 122 S. E. 852.

' It is true that the English courts, in the case of charitable enterprizes,
have carried Cy Pres beyond the limits recognized in cases of private interests; but they have drawn considerable support for this attitude from "the
statute of 43 Elizabeth, c, 4. See Keith v. Scales (1899) 124 N. C. 497.
32 S. E. 809, (1899), where Clark, J., calls attention to the fact that 43
Elizabeth in no way affects the validity of charitable devises in this country.
Also see note on Cy Pres Doctrine in North Carolina, 1 N. C. Law Rev. 41.
'Keith v. Scales, supra.
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STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

As government and business become more complex, legislatures
turn to various bodies of experts to assist in administering the law
and carrying on the governmental functions. This was already indicated in the discussion of the regulation of trades and callings, where,
in each case, some administrative body or commission is called upon
to carry out the statutory program. Some further administrative
agencies of the State, including investigating commissions, are mentioned herewith:
1. Ch. 29 creates the position of Commissioner of Pardons who
is appointed by the Governor and whose duty it is to assist the Governor in connection with applications for pardons, commutations and
reprieves. While the final decision in any case is with the Governor,
it is likely that the recommendation of the Commissioner of Pardons
will be followed, since he is in a position to make a decision and the
Governor must depend on his judgment, unless he selects to take
the time to do the work himself.
2. 'Ch. 62 establishes the State Sinking Fund Commission, composed of the Governor, State Treasurer and Auditor, who shall manage the State sinking funds and invest such funds only in government bonds and under specific requirements as to the price at which
such bonds shall be purchased or sold.
3. The Budget Act is Ch. 89, with an amendment thereto in Ch.
230. As director of the budget, the Governor has large powers in
supervising the expenditure of State funds and in determining what
appropriations shall be made by the General Assembly. The idea
that our governments, Federal, State and local, should be run in a
business-like fashion is gaining prevalence and the budget system in
government is an attempt to carry out the wishes of the people that
government shall be administered economically and efficiently.
4. Ch. 120 is an attempt to place all State charitable institutions
on the same basis, with similar policies, so that the expense which
the State bears will be lightened by requiring those who are able to
pay to bear the expense of their care, maintenance and treatment.
Suits may be brought in favor of the State for the recovery of the
cost of caring for patients who are able to pay, and such patients may
be removed from State institutions if no payment is made.
5. Ch. 122 establishes a Department of Conservation and Development, which is to take the place of and which takes over the powers
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and duties exercised by the State Geological and Economic Survey,
the State Geological Board and the State Geologist. In addition, the
name of the new department indicates its principal function, which
is to aid, by investigation, recommendation and publication, in the
promotion of the development and conservation of the natural resources of the State and in the development of commerce and industry. The control of the department is vested in a Board of Conservation and Development, consisting of the Governor and six
members, one of whom shall be selected from the staff of the University and another from State College. The Board may conduct
investigations, compel the attendance of witnesses and make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out its work.
6. Ch. 125 creates the Salary and Wage Commission, composed
of five persons appointed by the Governor. The Commission is
authorized to study the wages paid to State employees and to classify
and standardize such wages in relation to the service rendered. Thus
the Commission has power to raise and lower wages of State employees, as long as they do it by classifying and standardizing the
various kinds of service rendered.
7. Ch. 163 provides for a complete reorganization of the State
Prison, the details of which are omitted for lack of space.
8. Ch. 203 createst an Educational Commission of twelve members to be appointed by the Governor. They are authorized to make
a survey of the systems of public education in the State, to investigate the cost of operation of the State's educational institutions,
both institutions of higher learning and high schools and grammar
schools, and to inform the public with regard to the State's educational problems so that a system of education may be developed to
meet the needs.
R. H. W.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
CAVEATS TO WILLs-By C. S. 4158 married women were in the
class of those under disability to file caveats to wills within the prescribed seven years. Ch. 81 removes married women from this
classification of disability and is in accordance with the modern tendency as to married women's property rights.
Ch. 86 authorizes the personal representative to renew an obligation of the deceased for not over two years, so as to bind the estate,
but not himself personally.
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It will be recalled that a writing was necessary under the Statute
of Frauds for personal liability in such a case.

Winow's ALLowANc.-Under C. S. 4112 the widow's year's
allowance was from stock, crops and provisions. By Ch. 92 it may
now be taken from "any other personal property."
PRIVATE SALE BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIvE-Under C. S. 69,
private sale was authorized only in certain cases-cotton, tobacco,
other crops, stocks, bonds, etc. Ch. 267 repeals the above section
and provides that the Clerk of Courts may authorize a sale of personal property (no particular kinds specified) whenever the personal
representative is of the opinion that the interests of the estate will be
promoted.
P. H. W.

